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FOREWORD
Omri Ben-Shahar*
It is tempting to open this symposium with yet another "boilerplate" salute to the challenge that standard-form contracts pose for contract law
doctrine. You may have seen many tributes to this fundamental problem. If I
were to offer my own variation on this familiar introduction, I would have
perhaps tried to come up with an original spin to induce you to read forward
another paragraph or two. I would probably have talked about a major divide within contract law between the "law of negotiations" and "product
regulation." The former is the body of doctrines that determine the legal
consequences of bargaining behavior; the latter is the assortment of substantive limitations on terms of bargains, some general to all contracts, others
industry- or area-specific. I would then have argued that the study of standard form belongs to the latter, not the former, and that this distinction can
help overcome many difficulties in contract law doctrine.
Such would surely be an appropriate overture for a conference on boilerplate. Boilerplate, recall, is the building blocks of standard-form,
nonnegotiated contracts. The enforceability of boilerplate is very much the
legal locus where the philosophical debate over the regulation of markets
hits the road. Boilerplate employment arbitration terms, for example, are the
core of one of the most intriguing and fundamental debates in current contract law over the scope of the unconscionability doctrine.'
And yet, with boilerplate being the theme of this symposium, there is a
looming paradoxical feature with such an introduction: it would be, in and
of itself, a boilerplate introduction! It would satisfy all the attributes that
introductions-to-symposia are known to have. It would begin with a general
reminder of the importance (and timeliness!) of the topic. It would demonstrate that the stakes are more than just conceptual-scholarly clarity, but also
that the business world anxiously awaits academia's last word on the
topic-here, the academic gospel concerning the efficacy of market contracts. The standard introduction would then maintain that the issues are not
yet resolved, cite leading scholars who have acknowledged how difficult the
issues are, and posit that this lack of resolution is manifested in inadequate
development of the doctrine. And finally, this hypothetical introduction
would lay out a set of questions that ought to be addressed and the various
ways in which the contributions to the symposium advance the answers to
these questions.
*
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You likely have read, by now, many such introductions-to-symposia, and
can recognize their boilerplate structure, their adherence to the how-towrite-an-introduction protocol. But if this hypothetical introduction-the
one I eventually decided not to write-is indeed standard and predictable, it
does not only introduce the topic of boilerplate; it also embodies that very
phenomenon. Thus, ironically, it must satisfy many of the characteristics of
boilerplate that the articles in this symposium will describe. Writing an introduction about boilerplate, it turns out, is also producing boilerplate!
Perhaps the most obvious analogy between boilerplate contracts and
boilerplate introductions is the following. Like boilerplate contracts, boilerplate introductions-to-symposia are not read by anybody. (Why, then, are
they written, you may naively wonder. I'll say something about this below.)
The "unreadness" property is of course a troubling phenomenon, both for
contracts and for symposia introductions. Luckily, some of the contributions
to this symposium address this unreadness feature of boilerplate. Robert
Hillman, for example, investigates whether advance disclosure mechanisms
can help consumers know what's in the contract or whether they would
merely backfire against the interests of consumers;2 Michelle Boardman
suggests that in some industries the unreadness (and unreadability) of boilerplate is a perfectly reasonable-in fact, desirable-feature of a system in
which contract terms are written not to expropriate value but to stabilize
meanings.3
Here is a second analogy between boilerplate terms and symposia introductions: they appear objective, but they are often one-sided. You can
probably recall some introductions to past symposia that you read (despite
their unreadness ... ), in which the introducer put on a mask of neutrality,

acknowledged all the relevant and conflicting perspectives, provided broadas-possible context and normative appeal, and yet planted in all of that objectivity his or her own controversial agenda, building upon a set of selective
assumptions and skewed observations. I am sure I can recall some such introductions, and I'm pretty sure I even wrote one. Similar to introductions,
this buried one-sidedness is also a very familiar feature of boilerplate contracts. Disguised by "legalese," they are often unbalanced, favoring their
drafter. But while the one-sidedness of consumer contracts is hardly a discovery, several contributions to the symposium offer a new understanding of
this phenomenon. Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner in one article,5 and

2. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandardTerms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006).
3. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MIcH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).
4. Omri Ben-Shahar, Forward-Freedomfrom Contract, in Symposium on Freedom from
Contract, 2004 Wisc. L. REV. 261.
5. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets. 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).
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Jason Johnston in another article, 6 argue that self-serving boilerplate terms
may not be as bad as they seem. They argue that one-sided terms are a general feature of contracts written by firms who care about their reputations
and who do not intend to strictly enforce such terms. These two articles argue that firms write one-sided terms in order to have the option to enforce
them selectively to fend off consumer opportunism, but otherwise let their
honest clients off. Johnston nicely calls it "tailored forgiveness"; Bebchuk
and Posner attribute this feature to the observability but nonverifiability of
opportunism-that is, to the difficulty of proving it in court. Both these articles portray a reality in which one-sidedness poses less of a concern than
previously thought. In contrast, Ronald Mann examines one-sided boilerplate in credit card contracts and concludes that they continue to burden
debtors.7 He suggests that contract law doctrine may be inadequate in dealing with this problem and explores the case for prohibitions against some
such terms or even a regulatory promulgation of more balanced mandatory
clauses.
There is another, more subtle feature of introductions-to-symposia,
which they again share with boilerplate terms. In a typical introduction, the
collection of articles in the symposium being introduced is not a result of a
tournament or competition between able scholars. The list is solicited and
tailored, and the writer of the introduction is usually the person who put
together this list and shaped it to correspond with what he or she perceives
to be the ideal agenda. In the same way that the introduction describes a
substance that is not negotiated but rather unilaterally tailored, the boilerplate contract stipulates a substance of a transaction that is not negotiated or
bilaterally dickered but rather dictated-unilaterally drafted. Of course, this
raises difficult questions about the relationship between boilerplate and the
power to dictate. Douglas Baird demonstrates in this symposium some of
the fallacies that have become all too common in addressing this relationship. He argues that the evils of concentrated economic power have nothing
to do with boilerplate. Revisiting some of the classic cases from the folklore
of contract law, he shows that it is not the fine print that makes some clauses
troublesome. But in a rich and original article, David Gilo and Ariel Porat
show a variety of previously unrecognized ways in which boilerplate terms do
operate in an anticompetitive fashion, such as to price-discriminate, facilitate
collusion among sellers, and deter entry by new sellers.9 The unilateral drafting of boilerplate is also studied by Jim White and me in a merchant-tomerchant context. We examine the contracts between automotive companies
6.

Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-

Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L.
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Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting"for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006).
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Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006).
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David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive

Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006).
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and their suppliers, one of the most important form contracts (in terms of
economic stakes) ever drafted.0 They uncover several ways in which the
drafters of these contracts prevent negotiations and tailoring from ever occurring to bolster their economic rents.
If there is a significant boilerplate element to the craft of writing an introduction-if introductions are indeed standard and predictable-this raises
the question: why bother writing them? Similarly, if a form contract is boilerplate to be used and replicated by many similarly situated parties, why
would any single individual have the incentive to draft it? A boilerplate contract is a public good-an item that is copied freely by others-and we
should therefore expect a problem of underproduction. This question is studied directly by Kevin Davis, who identifies the production paradox and
looks at the role of nonprofit organizations in generating boilerplate contracts." It is also studied by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, who look at the
incentives of boilerplate drafters and define their crucial role in giving interpretive meaning to boilerplate. 2 Choi and Gulati's study is even more
ambitious: it suggests that a better way to understand the emergence of boilerplate-and to interpret it when ambiguous-is to conceive of it as statute
and apply statutory interpretation techniques to dispute resolutions.
I have noticed another thing about published symposia: readers rarely sit
down to read an entire symposium from the introduction to the last article.
Rather, most readers may bump into one or a small subset of individual
symposium articles that are of particular interest to them. This suggests that,
other than for the participants in the conference, there is really no audience
for introductions. Summarizing to the hypothetical symposium reader what
the articles of the symposium are about is a service that future readers don't
really need and of which very few would make use. In other words, symposia introductions are a wasteful-inefficient?-scholarly effort. This
conclusion is every bit as unorthodox as the idea that boilerplate contracts
may also be inefficient. And yet the claim that boilerplate could be inefficient is a more difficult proposition to defend. There is a long tradition in
law and economics arguing for the efficiency of standard-form contracts.
Several of the contributions in this symposium, however, suggest otherwise
and provide either evidence or new theoretical underpinnings for the inefficiency conjecture. 3 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, studying the evolution of
boilerplate in sophisticated transactions, show why it is often unlikely that
boilerplate converges to the most efficient terms. 4
10. Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006).
REV.

11. Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
1075 (2006).
12.

Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contractas Statute, 104

MICH.

L. REv. 1129 (2006).

13. Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, show various ways in which boilerplate reduces competition and thus reduces total welfare; Ben-Shahar and White, supra note 10, suggest that standardform purchase orders in the automotive business exhibit various inefficient terms.
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If I somehow got you to read thus far, you may recognize that this introduction includes two types of information. The first type is specific to the
forthcoming symposium and conveys its particular context (for instance, my
references to the specific articles and to the prior standard-form contracts
literature). The second type of stuff you read is more general and can be
used, with almost no changes, to introduce other symposia on a variety of
topics. This distinction roughly corresponds to what Henry Smith, in his
important contribution to this symposium, calls intensive and extensive
communications." Contracts, when drafted ad hoc, are highly intensive information-rich rights. Property, in contrast, is less context dependent, less
information specific, and therefore more extensive. Smith suggests that boilerplate represents a shift of contractual rights toward the status of property.
He argues that the modularity feature of boilerplate is what allows it to have
its extensive appeal.
Finally, in many contracts that are otherwise skewed in favor of their
drafters, we nevertheless find boilerplate terms that appear to accord some
balance. For example, one of the "hidden roles" of boilerplate that Gilo and
Porat discover in their article is the provision of true and accessible bene-6
fits-but only to those who labor to read the unreadable contract.1
Likewise, two contributions to this conference are aimed at providing more
balance-and more fairness?-to the otherwise dominant law-andeconomics presence, but, like boilerplate, can be accessible mainly to readers who will labor to read through most of the other articles. I have asked
two of the more influential scholars that have studied standard-form contracts using other approaches to comment on the ideas that are advanced in
the symposium. Accordingly, Margaret Jane Radin, whose recent work identifies new challenges posed by standardization of contract in the digital
age, 7 and Todd Rakoff, whose seminal work on contracts of adhesion continues to provide a baseline for the study of form contracts, 8 responded to
this challenge.' 9 Note that these commentaries are anything but the boilerplate commentaries that sometimes are affixed to symposium articles.
Rather, this symposium provides a platform for Radin and for Rakoff to examine the emerging inventory of new ideas about boilerplate-an inventory
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Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine,

70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L. J. 1125 (2000); Margaret Jane Radin, Regime Change in Intellectual Property
Law: Superseding the Law of the State with the "Law" of the Firm, I U. OTrAWA L. & T"ICH. J. 173
(2003-2004).
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that is hopefully richer after this symposium-and to reevaluate their own
thinking on the topic.
As occasional market transactors, you surely know that many important
details of transactions you are about to enter are buried in boilerplate, but
you often prefer to read sellers' pamphlets to figure out the big picturewhat the bargain is about. What, then, is the big picture coming out of this
symposium? What can we write on our pamphlet? I think we can safely say
this symposium is breaking new ground in the study of boilerplate and standard forms beyond the general claims about market power, competition for
terms, and network externalities. On a theoretical level, boilerplate is shown
to be a legal phenomenon different from contract. Is it a statute? Is it property? Is it a product? On an empirical level, boilerplate is studied in specific
contexts, including insurance, credit cards, auto manufacturing, debt financing, and electronic commerce. The contributions to the symposium reveal
subtle and previously unrecognized ways in which boilerplate clauses encourage information flow-but also dampen it; increase competition-but
also reduce it; how new boilerplate terms are produced-and how innovation in boilerplate is stifled; how negotiation happens in the shadow of
boilerplate-and how it is subdued; and offer new explanations as to why
boilerplate is so often one-sided. With emphasis on empiricism and economic thinking, this symposium provides a more nuanced understanding of
the DNA of market contracts-the boilerplate terms.

